INTRODUCTION
tential market of over 425 million people emerges.
The world was astonished in 1989 by the initial That is a market nearly 70 percent larger than the collapse of socialist institutions and subsequently by United States about 31 percent larger than the Eurothe pace at which change swept across the Eastern pean Community market, and moe than double the European region. For a time, even the Soviet Union size of the rapid growth markets along the Pacific seemed to be moving toward greater political pluralRm. ism, market orientation and the effective end of the Cold War. It is now approaching two years since this Although the region is a potential market in that some summary observations. purchasing power is still sharply constrained by low . PROBLES AND POTENTIALS productivity, there is a strong pent-up demand for I. PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS goods and services to help improve living standards. Until the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, Some notion of the market's potential can be seen there was intense and building interest throughout from a comparison of the high consumption levels the business community (and especially agribusiof adjacent Western Europe. While incomes in Eastness) in Europe and the Soviet Union. The reasons ern Europe are well above those of the developing are clear; the region has enormous potential business world, they nevertheless are but a fraction of those opportunity.
in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and The first aspect of this potential is simply size. The the United States (less than $6,000 per capita per six countries plus the former East Germany have a annum in Eastern Europe versus about $20,000 in population of 136 million people. Add to that the Western Europe and the United States). Any growth almost 290 million people of the USSR, and a poin incomes can be expected to be accompanied by increasing consumption in attempts to quickly imthe development of an environment conducive to prove living standards. free enterprise. There must be creation of the infraBesides interest in the region as a market, many structure required to support and facilitate a market firms are considering strategic business positions in economy. For example, privatization cannot be carEastern Europe as a "backdoor" means to avoid ried out without a legal framework allowing private being locked out of the EC by the 1992 unification.
property to be held and freely transferred, without a It is almost certain that most of these countries (and capital market of some kind, without free prices to perhaps eventually even the USSR) will be granted enable valuation of the assets to be privatized, etc. preferential access to the enlarged EC market (if not
The magnitude of the adjustments required full EC membership), and companies located there throughout the economies and the dislocations that will be well-situated to participate in all European affect specific groups are simply enormous. The markets including the EC. Also, location in an Eastgovernments must be sensitive to the burdens of the ern European country may prove to be beneficial for various groups as they simultaneously design and taking advantage of opportunities emerging in the implement new systems that support growth and USSR.
economic expansion-a very formidable task Agribusiness companies also are interested in indeed. other business possibilities in the region. Direct product sales are important, but both joint ventures II. PROGRESS TO DATE and direct investments are being considered as a
The euphoria that accompanied the decline of means to establish manufacturing and sales facili- .r • being embraced. Moreover, the political revolutions must still be overcome in the transformation to creen emrace ore e olitical reolutions are not fully complete min some countries (Bulgaria, ate environments m which that potential can be oi iso e i Romania, Yugoslavia) so that the economic shifts realized. All of the economies were stagnant or in have barely begun. decline when the process started, suffering fromy decades of gross mismanagement which were comThe pace of economic reform has been most rapid pounding the inherent weaknesses of central planin Poland, followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia ning itself, so that the problems were virtually with the other countries lagging much further beoverwhelming. And there are no economic road hind. [This excludes the special case of the former maps. There is no precedent whatsoever for the shift German Democratic Republic which was absorbed from central planning to a market economy. The very into the FRG and thus had available immediately the process itself must be invented even as it is being supporting systems (legal system, convertible curcarried out.
rency, accounting standards, etc.) rather than having The economic problems plaguing most of the to develop those.] countries, and which must be successfully overWhile there has been considerable concern about come, include: high inflation; non-convertible curconditions in Eastern Europe, the situation there is rencies; multiple exchange rates; state ownership of not nearly as bleak as the impression often left by the physical assets; huge, inefficient bureaucracies;
western press. Much of the press reports reflect what wage and price controls; no labor or capital markets; people are saying. However, it has been noted that large fiscal deficits; large external debts; huge subpublic complaining has grown enormously with the sidies throughout; no notion of consumer demand or advent of a free press, something not possible under customer service; little comprehensive underthe previous repressive government. The most amstanding of private enterprise or market economies, bitious of the reform programs is the "shock therand woefully few private enterprise skills (legal, apy" approach undertaken by Poland, with its accounting, marketing, managerial).
ultimate objective of a full market economy. AccordSuccessful economic transformation requires ingly, it is being very closely watched by the other more than abstract policy changes; it also requires countries and by the Soviets as well. 90
On January 1, 1990, Poland adopted a far-ranging result of "collective dismissals" from entire or parstrategy including: freeing retail prices, abolishing tial plant closings. Some estimates suggest that only subsidies, terminating state monopolies, devaluing about one-half of the registered number has actually the greatly overvalued currency and unifying the been laid off. Many workers are leaving the state exchange rate, ending foreign exchange rationing, sector voluntarily to find betterjobs in the fast-growand cutting tariffs. The results have been largely as ing private sector. There is, in fact, a shortage of predicted. Output has fallen, real wages are down, labor in some big cities at this time. unemployment continues to rise, inflation remains
Reports from Poland indicating severe production high (at 5 percent per month, but greatly slowed from declines (said to have fallen almost one-third last the hyperinflation of late 1989 and early 1990), all year) also are probably significantly exaggerated. inflicting considerable economic pain on the Polish First, the benchmark estimates had likely been conpeople. Once freed, prices generally rose quickly.
siderably inflated by Communist managers who The higher prices greatly dampened demand, and padded their output figures to get bonuses or promogoods soon began appearing on store shelves. The tions. (Now, there are incentives to under-report to initial upward spurt in prices accelerated inflation, avoid taxes.) Second, the measure of national indusbut the accompanying collapse in demand helped trial output is seriously flawed since it captures only temper that and induced the subsequent recession.
the activity in the state-owned industrial sector. It As production declined, many of the state enterprises does not include non-industrial or private firms. A folded, finding they could not operate without their substantial amount of production has shifted from former subsidies (especially when producing state to private firms, and from industry to the servshoddy goods that no one really wanted). Unemices sector. Some estimates suggest that perhaps only ployment rose rapidly, but has fallen to only about 7 one-third of the reported decline is real. percent of the workforce, close to the current U.S.
Poland has paid especial attention to its trade secrate.
tor. It made the zloty convertible on the trade account However, there is a brighter side to the bad ecofrom the outset, and, since the infrastructure did not nomic news about Eastern Europe. Things are not exist for instant domestic competition to develop, it nearly as dismal as often reported. Again, the case of has viewed free trade as the most effective means of Poland is instructive, importing competition. Free trade allows the imporSince the anti-export bias was removed from Poltation of a rational price structure, and stimulates ish economic policies at the beginning of 1990, contacts with western firms which bring their new exports to the west have grown rapidly to $11.4 technology and improved products. billion, up from $8.5 billion in 1989, with some Finally, reports of huge declines in living standards increase coming from all sectors of the economy. At also appear exaggerated. When prices were freed the same time, imports fell as enterprises econoand the subsidies were removed, purchasing power mized on raw material use in response to budget was reduced. But the oft-mentioned 30 percent deconstraints and a higher valued currency. The zloty, dine is a comparison of 1990 with 1989, a year of which was devalued by two-thirds, was pegged at hyperinflation when wages were growing rapidly. If PLZ 9,500/U.S. $1 and maintained at that rate the comparison is with 1987, the decline in real throughout the year. With the establishment of stawages is seen to be much smaller. And there are bilization funds, it also became convertible on the intangible changes that are not reflected in the meastrade account.
urement. For example, Polish housewives no longer The rising unemployment numbers also merit have to spend two to three hours each day in queues some explanation. In the first place, they began from only to be presented with few choices among inferior a very low level (the theoretical zero unemployment products. The increased dollar purchasing power of of a socialist system), rising to the current estimate the now stable zloty also has a little-noticed positive of about 1.25 million workers. However, the estieffect on the standard of living. At the black market mates may overstate the actual change. Many of the rate for the dollar, the average monthly wage was workers registering had been unemployed already in $40 in late 1987. In late 1990, it was $131, making the previous system. Registrations were also spurred available many foreign goods that were formerly by expectations that benefits would be available, unattainable. prompting the enrollment of many housewives enTo be sure, there are many difficulties with the tering the labor force for the first time and of traders Polish reform program. Even though much has been seeking to augment their unreported income. Overaccomplished in little more than a year, the pace still all, layoffs have actually been fewer than expected.
proved unsatisfactory to many voters who elected Only a small proportion of the unemployment is a Lech Walesa on promises of even faster reforms. 91
Privatization, especially, has been slow, and the 5 expanding markets for U.S. farm products, food percent monthly inflation continues to be a major products, farming technologies and production inproblem. Shifting the productive assets into private puts, and food processing technology and equiphands is the immediate challenge. The new Prime ment? Or will they become direct competitors, not Minister and his government favor an accelerated only in their own and third country markets, but will program, and new steps are expected before spring.
they also seek much greater direct access to the U.S. But the task is formidable. Some five to seven thoumarket? sand enterprises must be privatized, likely by some Examination of these questions involves two time unique large-scale means since the absence of credit periods: the transition during the next two to four institutions and share markets precludes typical apyears as the agriculture and food sectors adjust to proaches.
free market systems; and the longer run after the Another continuing major problem for Poland is transitional adjustments are complete. the huge external debt, now at almost $45 billion. Its mere existence stifles critically-needed foreign inThe Short Term Outlook vestment. Increasing calls are being made for for-
The first possibility concerns expanding sales of giveness of much of that debt, especially the part U.S. agricultural products. It is noteworthy that these (about two-thirds) owed to foreign governments. countries have not been major agricultural trading Proponents argue that this was money loaned to partners for the United States over the past decade. Communist governments for political reasons (to try
In calendar year 1989, U.S. agricultural export sales to draw Poland closer to a consumer society), and in Eastern Europe amounted to only $320 million that it should not now be an impediment to the (less than 1 percent of the U.S. total). At the same successful transformation to democracy and market time, U.S. imports were even less ($245 million), for economies.
a net trade surplus of $75 million. Our exports are Problems of other countries in the region are simiprimarily grains (feed grains and wheat) and soylar to those of Poland. Their relatively slower pace bean meal, while the imports are meats, cheeses, in instituting reforms relates to practical politics, tobacco, and other specialty products. cultural differences, and their individual situations.
The trade picture with the Soviet Union contrasts The Polish people thus far have been unwavering in sharply with that of the rest of the region. In calendar their willingness to bear economic hardship during year 1989, we sold $3.4 billion to the Soviets (9 the transition. Citizens of the other countries are not percent of total sales), while importing less than $20 thought to be as willing as the Poles to give their million. leadership the political mandate to move so quickly.
There was some initial euphoria that these counThus, the reform process in Hungary and Czechoslotries would be rapidly expanding markets for U.S. vakia is not proceeding as rapidly as in Poland, and grain, oilseed, and livestock products. Although that it is certainly much slower in Romania, Bulgaria, expectation vanished quickly, there may well be and Yugoslavia (where the ethnic divisions among some expansion of their imports over the next few other things undermine obtaining political stability years as their purchasing power increases over levels required to effect reforms).
of the past decade. Additional income sources will be economic assistance from the West, external debt III. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
relief, and perhaps some improvement in their AGRICULTURE AND AGRIBUSINESS economies as the transformation programs begin to The Central and Eastern European countries traditake hold (growing convertible currency sales to the tionally have been relatively large agricultural proWest accompanying their already greater access to ducers and traders. But their farming and food these markets, for example. The EC already has systems suffered heavily during the Communist era, concluded Preferential Trade Agreements with Polargely isolated from new technologies and made land, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and the U.S. has increasingly inefficient by central planning. Also, it now granted Most Favored Nation status to three of is important to note that while the region maintains the countries and is in the process of doing so for the a large livestock sector, it is a deficit protein proothers. ducer.
Proponents of reform argue that debt relief is esThe central question, of course, is what the producsential. Collectively, their outstanding debt aption patterns of the future will be, once market prices proaches $100 billion, with the most (two-thirds) rather than centrally set quotas and goals allocate owed by Poland and Hungary ($1,200 per capita). resources and guide farmers' production and conSeveral billion dollars are required each year for sumers' purchase decisions. Will these countries be Poland to service its almost $45 billion debt, an 92 important share of total foreign exchange earnings.
Without exception, these countries (especially the Roughly two thirds of the debt is owed to other USSR) are starved for consumer goods and the techgovernments, and one third to commercial banks. nologies used to produce them in the West. They Substantial forgiveness by the former, and liberal likely will purchase farm production inputs to boost restructuring by the latter, could free several billion output quickly so as to reduce (or at least stabilize) annually for critical import needs. Hungary, with a food prices and improve quality and variety. These $20 billion debt, would benefit in much the same inputs include fertilizers, pesticides, specialized maway.
chinery, and livestock feed (especially proteins, but The magnitude of economic assistance flowing to also feed grains). With a tradition of animal agriculthe region is substantial. The group of 24 industrialture, these countries are interested especially in liveized nations (G-24) has pledged and contributed $38 stock production technology-new breeding and billion in grants and loans to Eastern Europe over the husbandry techniques, including artificial inseminalast 18 months. Originally targeted to Poland and tion and embryo transplants. They can also be exHungary, the program now extends to Czechoslovapected to purchase some food grains (bread quality kia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. (Earwheat for blending), perhaps some meat products, lier plans to include Romania were scrapped when and other incidental food products. demonstrations were violently suppressed in BuchaThese countries likely will consider the mainterest last June. However, the political situation there nance and improvement of their livestock sectors is viewed as improving, and aid could be granted very important. Greater efficiency and expansion are soon.) associated with improved animal nutrition, which Of these funds, about two-thirds have gone to depends upon protein feed supplements. The region Poland and Hungary, and 5 percent to Czechoslovais deficient in protein production, largely owing to kia (with nearly one-quarter still unallocated). The climate. Thus, it is reasonable to expect increased $38 billion includes $11 billion capitalization for the protein imports, at least in the short run. newly-established European Bank for ReconstrucBeyond this, another high-priority area is food tion and Development which will loan throughout processing machinery and equipment and improved the region and the USSR, $8 billion in grants, and packaging materials. The centrally planned systems $12 billion in loans and credits including over $1 are notorious for post-harvest losses, commonly 30 billion in European Investment Bank credit guaranpercent or more. Most processing technology is antees. The World Bank and the IMF have made availtiquated, consisting of machinery long discarded by able $6 billion.
the West. Even the newer facilities have had little About 35 percent of all the aid has been export maintenance or upgrading for a decade or more. credits and investment support, while macroecoImproved processing capacity and more modem nomic aid (such as stabilization loans) accounts for packaging will not only reduce losses and increase 29 percent. About 4 percent has gone to food aid and the quantity of food available, but should also im-2.4 percent to the environment. (The 12 member prove quality and presentation to consumers. states of the EC individually have provided 48 perTo summarize, the Eastern European countries can cent of all aid, the EC budget accounts for 18 percent, expect increased purchasing power in the next few Japan 11 percent, and the United States 9 percent). years, and likely will increase their purchases of Overall, it is very apparent that these countries' farm inputs, feedstuffs (including feed grains and purchasing power already has grown and likely will soybean meal), food processing machinery and techgrow substantially more in the next few years. This nology. then raises the question of what they are likely to buy.
Food (and agriculture) can be expected to figure The Long-Term Outlook prominently, because of their special political sigBut what about the longer term? What kind of nificance in all these economies. Food availability trading partners will these countries be in five or ten and prices are barometers of economic progress and years? Since the changes have only begun, it is the success of the economic reform programs. The simply much too early to tell. Much depends on how economic reforms that freed food prices (and ended productive they become, and what they can afford. subsidies) also raised consumer prices and increased After decades of mismanagement, administered the income share required for food (already one half prices, and artificially determined resource allocaor more of the disposable income in most of these tion, today's production and consumption patterns countries.) For reasons closely related to political may bear little relation to those which market forces stability, food product purchases will receive high will dictate. Substantial production adjustments will priority.
occur in the next few years, and likely will be accom-93 panied by expansions in output because of greater plications obviously are far different for different access to improved inputs. (Much of the planned subsectors of U.S. agriculture and agribusiness. OECD assistance will be production-sector oriented, Beyond product sales, U.S. agribusinesses have i.e., promoting greater output.) These short-run critical interests in unfolding potential opportunities shifts are unlikely to alter trade patterns fundamenacross the European continent. While opportunities tally.
vary depending upon strategic interests, many U.S. The longer run may prove to be a much different agribusinesses are contemplating investment in the matter. How will Eastern Europe and the USSR region. The motivations are varied. Some wish to develop as trading partners? Will they be self suffiestablish operating entities that can take full advancient in grains and meats? Will they be growing tage of relatively inexpensive assets to combine protein importers? Will they prove larger or smaller them with their modem technology and management markets for U.S. farm products? Again, it is simply to create highly efficient and competitive businesses too early to tell. The outcome depends on capital for the entire European market. Others are more availability and investment patterns, as well as polinterested in sourcing raw material for key market icy decisions. The mismanagement, distortions, and opportunities, while still others simply position resource misallocations have been enormous, develthemselves for access to the enlarged European maroped by powerful forces over long periods of time.
ket-Eastern Europe and the USSR, but certainly the And they will be expensive and time consuming to Western European market as well-a response in overcome.
part to "Europe 1992." Now that internal prices will reflect world market Eastern Europe and the USSR are the new business prices (to varying extents, but certainly more than frontiers of today. The first investors and operating previously) and will allocate resources, the emerging firms to become established likely will be the most production and investment patterns may prove far advantageously situated. But while the region holds different from those under central planning. These vast potential, it also involves enormous risks sugpatterns will also be influenced by non-agricultural gesting it be approached with realistic caution and factors, such as labor costs which will be relatively careful assessment of the opportunities. low, at least for such a while. This might suggest that competitive positions could be improved by focusSummary ing on relatively labor-intensive production, such as Much of the euphoria that accompanied the initial fruits and vegetables, livestock and meat, and valueemergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and the added products (if enough hard currency capital is USSR has faded, now that the enormous task of available to upgrade production facilities to produce restructuring these economies is underway. And, export quality products). Exports will be of special while the potential longer-term impacts of these interest, because of the proximity of Western Euroshifts on U.S. agriculture remain far from clear, they pean markets, and perhaps others, as well. For exlikely mean greater short-term market opportunities ample, meat exports to the USSR for hard currency as economic reform, development assistance and could be attractive since trade among the COMErevitalized economic growth permit Eastern Europe CON countries is shifting quickly to a convertible to buy more from the West. currency basis.
The picture is much less clear in the USSR where What about the USSR over the long term? The imports of U.S. products were already large. Even in political situation now is so fluid that economic the short term, their needs for western agricultural conjecture is not very meaningful. The political situproducts will be very large. The primary concern is ation will determine long-run economic developwhether growing political uncertainty and currency ment progress. The USSR is now a big U.S. market problems will encourage the credit and support the ($3.4 billion U.S. imports). Substantial development level of imports necessary to meet domestic needs over the next decade (requiring a tranquil political and increase productivity. evolution) means greater opportunity to develop its The region's longer-term potential continues to be agricultural infrastructure and to invest in agribusienormous. The six Eastern European countries plus nesses of all kinds. This could reduce total import the USSR create a potential market much larger than needs, especially for feed grains, but could still do the United States, the EC, and the Pacific Rim. involve substantial trade in both finished goods and Incomes and consumption levels are low, compared inputs (for example, protein feed concentrates). In with levels in Western Europe and the United States. any event, improvement in the Soviet food situation Consumption can be expected to grow rapidly, comwill require substantial external assistance, whether mensurate with income growth. These countries are in raw materials or processing technology. The imwealthy in resources and have a well-educated labor 94 force. Their growth potential now is limited primaryet, since they have only begun. Future production ily by the pace of the reforms and the availability of and consumption patterns may bear little resemlonger-term investment capital.
blance to those of today, which reflect the mismanIn general, economic reform is progressing more agement, administered prices and artificially rapidly than has been reported by the western press. determined resource allocation of the last four Poland is an example; recent elections strengthened decades. their commitment to economic reform. And, while These shifts depend on both political and ecothe economic shocks of free market prices have been nomic relationships, especially the critical question severe, they are far smaller than indicated by the of market access for these countries. And the pattern press. will depend on capital availability and investment Unemployment in near western levels in Poland, patterns over the longer run. The mismanagement, exports are growing, the currency has stabilized, and distortions, and resource misallocations have been investment is increasing. Declines in living standenormous, developed by powerful forces over long ards, while serious, have been much smaller than periods of time. They will be both expensive and initially indicated. Perhaps the greatest problem is time consuming to overcome, now that internal the huge external debt, much of which is held by prices will reflect world market prices rather than western governments, and which could be restrucarbitrary administrative decisions. tured/reduced to increase capital available for trade Initially, cheap labor could lead to concentration and investment.
on labor intensive, high value added production Problems of other countries in the region are simi-(fruits and vegetables, livestock and meats), assumlar to those of Poland, although the approach and ing capital to bring facilities to export quality can be pace of reform varies widely. In general, the reform found. And much of the eventual outcome will deprocess in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is not propend on the resolution of the fluid political situation ceeding as rapidly as in Poland, and it certainly is in the USSR. There, substantial short-and long-term much slower in Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia economic assistance will be required. Whether or not (where ethnic divisions, among other things, underthe internal situation in the USSR permits that, inmines political stability required to effect reforms).
vestment will have a major role in determining the The implications of these changes for U.S. agriculfuture shape of U.S. markets in the region. ture over the longer term simply cannot be seen as
